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Enclaves of Inequality: Brasiguaios and the Transformation of 
the Brazil-Paraguay Borderlands 
 
Jacob Blanc 
 
Abstract: This article traces the history of Brazilian immigration to Paraguay and the emergence 
of ‘Brasiguaio’ communities, arguing that the enclaves are products of the development policies 
of each country’s military dictatorship. Although Brasiguaios are currently associated with 
wealthy Brazilian agriculturalists in Paraguay, the majority of these immigrants have been poor 
workers who face constant marginalization from state bureaucracies and unequal access to land. 
Paraguay’s eastern border region is among the most complex spaces in Latin America of 
cultural, economic, and national hybridity. The transformation of this borderland is predicated on 
a highly unequal social hierarchy that resulted largely from the evolution of Brasiguaio 
immigration. 
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 An estimated 450,000 Brazilians currently live along Paraguay’s eastern border region, 
accounting for sixty percent of the region’s inhabitants and nearly ten percent of Paraguay’s 
entire population.1 Starting in the 1960s, settlers that came to be known as Brasiguaios (an 
amalgam of the Portuguese words for ‘Brazilian’ and ‘Paraguayan’) crossed the border into 
Paraguay and established enclaves that present some of the most intriguing and least studied 
cases of rural immigration in modern Latin America. Despite the dominant perception of 
Brasiguaios as wealthy agriculturalists devoted to soybean production, the majority of Brazilian 
immigrants in Paraguay are small-scale farmers who, like many of their impoverished 
Paraguayan neighbors, have faced constant marginalization.2 In the past decade, violent clashes 
                                                 
1 Although it is difficult to establish the exact number of Brazilians living in Paraguay, most estimations fall 
between 400,000 and 500,000. A commonly cited number is 459,147 from a 2002 report by the Brazilian Ministry 
of Exterior Relations (cited in Albuquerque 2010, 59). It must also be noted that while Brazilians comprise the 
largest portion of migrants in Paraguay, other immigrant groups in Paraguay include (in order of largest population) 
Koreans, Uruguayans, Mexicans, Japanese, Chileans and Germans. (Menegotto 2004, 46) 
2 The author would like to thank professors Gay Seidman and Francisco Scarano at the University of Wisconsin and 
the two anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Peasant Studies. Additionally, conversations in the summer of 2013 
helped shape the arguments found herein; special thanks to Ricardo Canese and Herib Caballero Campos in 
Paraguay, and Senilde Guanaes and Paulo Renato in Brazil. 
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between landless Paraguayans and powerful Brazilian landowners have cast an unprecedented 
spotlight on Brasiguaios.3 Rather than focusing on the dynamics of these recent conflicts, this 
essay seeks to examine the origins of Brasiguaio immigration in order to understand the 
characteristics and contradictions that have redefined the Brazil-Paraguay border. In doing so, I 
will argue that the actions and contexts of both nations set in motion the transformation of the 
space between them, a process that was profoundly shaped by the role of Brasiguaios. 
Brasiguaio immigration was the product of the military regimes of Brazil and Paraguay. 
The ambitions of both governments met at their shared frontier along the Alto Paraná 
borderlands, a region where small-scale farmers were initially deployed in order to clear and 
settle Paraguayan lands, only to then be discarded when monopolies of Brazilian agriculturalists 
were eventually established. The evolution of a Brazilian presence in Paraguay can be attributed 
to three distinct—yet highly connected—processes. The first was the unveiling of national 
development goals where each dictatorship prioritized industrialization and territorial expansion. 
A second factor was the construction of the Itaipu Dam, a bi-national development project built 
directly on the Brazil-Paraguay border that, when completed in 1991, was the largest 
hydroelectric dam on the planet. Whereas development plans had already set in motion the 
reallocation of people and capital toward the Alto Paraná borderlands, the Itaipu Dam was the 
first major catalyst of Brazilian immigration to Paraguay. Most significantly, Itaipu’s initial 
treaty required Paraguay to lift its century-old ban on Brazilian immigration. With the border 
now open, the governments of both nations urged Brazilian farmers into Paraguay with the 
promise of cheap, available, and fertile lands.  
                                                 
3 An example of the global media coverage of land conflicts and their attendant role in the impeachment of 
Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo include: Romero 2012. 
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On the heels of the Itaipu Dam, the third and final process that determined the evolution 
of Brasiguaio enclaves was the mechanization of agriculture. Once a significant number of 
small-scale Brazilian farmers had established a presence in eastern Paraguay, the military 
regimes of both countries encouraged new forms of industrial agriculture. Above all, this meant 
the production of soybeans, a crop that required a relatively minimal workforce and led to the 
complete reorientation of land relations along the border. As soy grew in importance, land 
became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a new rural elite and small-farmers were 
displaced and exploited at an alarming rate.4 That these agricultural oligarchies were comprised 
almost exclusively of Brazilians indicates the complex dynamics of Brasiguaio immigration: 
Brazilians living in Paraguay wound up being expelled by their own countrymen.  
In seeking to understand the impacts of Brasiguaio immigration, this paper will lean on 
the perspectives of borderlands theory. Such an approach allows us to look beyond the existence 
of borders as political constructs and to focus instead on the historical effects of borderlands, 
above all on how the social dynamics of border regions affect the formation and territorialization 
of states and communities. Whereas the literature on frontiers and borders initially came about in 
the context of the U.S. West from scholars like Frederick Jackson Turner and Herbert Eugene 
Bolton, in recent years the field of borderlands studies has become highly innovative and 
employed to interpret regions throughout the world. (Weber 1986, Adelman and Aron 1999, 
Hämäläinen and Truett, 2011) As Cañizares-Esguerra (2007) has shown, these theories have 
been especially useful in examining Latin America, where the concept of borders is deeply 
rooted in the realities of colonial history. However, scholarship on Latin American borderlands 
has tended to focus primarily on the U.S.-Mexico border (Weber 2009, Johnson 2010, St. John 
                                                 
4 It should be observed that 77 percent of Paraguay’s arable land is currently owned by just two percent of the 
population. (Source: Hobbs 2012) 
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2011) and as such, the present article will intervene by extending the conceptual framework of 
this literature further down to the Southern Cone. 
In their seminal study of borderlands, Baud and Schendel (1997, 216) wrote that ‘borders 
create political, social, and cultural distinctions, but simultaneously imply the existence of (new) 
networks and systems of interactions across them.’ So rather than analyzing the Brasiguaios 
through the rhetoric and intentions of central governments, we are better able to concentrate on 
the social realities provoked by them. In the case of Brasiguaios, these social realities are 
productions of the ways in which the Alto Paraná borderlands have been completely transformed 
in the span of only a few generations. Because of the policies and development goals of Brazil 
and Paraguay’s military regimes, the political border between them has essentially dissolved, 
leaving in its place a re-imagined frontier where class conflict and access to land have replaced 
nationality as the primary determinants of social hierarchy. 
 Scholarship on Brasiguaio immigration first emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as 
authors like Domingo Laino (1977), J.M.G. Kleinpenning (1987), and Alfredo da Mota Menezes 
(1990) argued that the abusive policies of the Stroessner regime were at fault for the dire 
conditions facing Paraguayan farmers. Following these initial studies, foreign economists like 
Andrew Nickson (1981, 1988) and Beverly Nagel (1991, 1999) examined the transformation of 
Paraguay’s eastern border region and traced the emergent soybean enclaves to the presence of 
Brazilian immigration and the mechanization of agriculture. As the soybean industry came to 
dominant Paraguay’s economy by the late 1990s, a new movement of scholar-activists, led by 
the Paraguayan sociologist Ramón Fogel, dedicated themselves to revealing the destructive 
nature of the industry and the abuse of their countrymen. (Fogel 1990) In response to these harsh 
criticisms, a sustained debate emerged that explored the characteristics of Brasiguaio 
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communities in order to nuance their image as homogenous usurpers of Paraguayan lands. 
(Wagner 1990, Cortês 1994, Feliú 2004, Menegotto 2004, Albuquerque 2010) Although this 
recent scholarship has correctly softened the dichotomy between nationalities, it has failed to 
sufficiently acknowledge the dominant power relations both among the wide spectrum of 
Brazilian farmers, and between the administrations of Brazil and Paraguay. As such, the present 
article will intervene in the existing literature by looking less at the geopolitics between 
countries, and more at how inequalities formed in the borderlands as a by-product of their 
development policies and practices. 
Although they are associated with wealthy landowners, the historical construction of the 
phrase “Brasiguaio” reveals its deeper complexity. The term Brasiguaio was first publically 
articulated in 1985 in a conversation between a peasant and the Brazilian congressman Sérgio 
Cruz. The encounter took place during a meeting between Brasiguaio leaders originally from the 
Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul currently living in the city of Mundo Novo, in the 
Paraguayan border region of La Paloma. The peasant addressed Congressman Cruz, stating that, 
‘I mean to say that we don’t have rights as Paraguayans because we aren’t Paraguayan; we don’t 
have rights as Brazilians because we abandoned the country. But tell me something: in the end, 
who are we?’ Cruz responded by saying: ‘You are Brasiguaios, a mix of Brazilians with 
Paraguayans, men without a country.’ (Wagner 1990, 11) 
 The notion of being men without a country is at the heart of understanding the history of 
this borderland. While the overall path of Brasiguaio settlement corresponded to the 
development plans of the Brazilian and Paraguayan governments, the struggles of thousands of 
nameless immigrants prove that the region’s transformation did not generate prosperity for the 
vast majority of workers who crossed the border. More than just representing an immigrant 
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enclave built on unequal social relations, Brasiguaios became vehicles and sites of contested 
citizenship and claims to land, embodying the dynamics of one of Latin America’s most complex 
borderlands. 
 
The Formation of a Borderland 
The current border between Brazil and Paraguay was established in the Loizaga Cotegipe 
Treaty of 1872 that ended the Triple Alliance War—a victory for Brazil that killed nearly 90% of 
Paraguay’s male population. At that time, little economic importance was attached to the region 
and the relevant part of the treaty stated simply that the border should follow the Paraná River. 
The treaty’s unclear description of the limits of the Paraná’s shores, however, led each country to 
claim jurisdiction over the area.5 Despite the region’s fertile lands and strategic position on a 
river that runs through four countries and empties into the Atlantic Ocean, the borderlands 
played a relatively insignificant role for the better part of the next century. It was not until the 
1950s—when both Brazil and Paraguay embarked on new programs of national development—
that the border region rose to international importance. Soon after taking power in Paraguay in 
1954, General Alfredo Stroessner began an ambitious program of road building that linked the 
capital city of Asunción with the furthermost reaches of the country, namely the Chaco in the 
west and the Paraná River in the east. Upon his election in 1956, Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil 
began a similar project of economic development that included increased direct foreign 
investment, import-substitution programs and the relocation of the Brazilian national capital to 
the interior. 
                                                 
5 The ambiguity stemmed from the treaty’s inclusion of the hills surrounding the Sete Quedas waterfalls as part of 
the Paraná shores. (Albuquerque 2010, 36) 
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By the mid 1960s both Brazil and Paraguay were governed by military dictatorships and 
were in the early stages of unveiling development projects based on territorial expansion and the 
incorporation of new lands for agricultural production. It was in this context that Brazil initiated 
the process of developing a hydroelectric dam in the Alto Paraná borderlands and began to press 
its claim to the region. Although the Brazilian government had opened diplomatic negotiations 
with Paraguay over a potential partnership in constructing a dam in the early 1960s, it was only 
in the aftermath of Brazil’s 1964 military coup that any direct action was taken. After some 
initial hesitations, Paraguay finally agreed to open a dialogue with Brazil on the possibility of a 
joint development project, and officials from both nations met on June 22, 1966 at the Hotel das 
Cataratas in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil.6 This meeting produced the Act of Iguaçu that quelled 
tensions along the border and established the legal parameters for a bi-national energy project. 
Considering the historical enmity between Brazil and Paraguay, the Act of Iguaçu illustrates the 
extent to which both nations prioritized development and modernization. The Act outlined a 
survey of the hydroelectric potential of the borderlands and agreed that all energy produced by 
the ‘flows of the Paraná River, from and including the Sete Quedas Falls to the mouth of the 
Iguaçu River, will be divided in equal parts between both nations.’ (Mazzarollo 2003, 23) 
A critical—yet often overlooked—component of the Act of Iguaçu was that Paraguay 
also had to lift its restrictions on Brazilian immigration. Brazil had been seeking the legitimacy 
to expand its interests into Paraguayan lands yet until this point had been almost completely 
unsuccessful.7 With the Act of Iguaçu signed in 1966 Brazil took a two-pronged strategy for 
                                                 
6 At the meeting, Paraguay was represented by the diplomat Sapeña Pastor; the Brazilian delegation was led by the 
diplomat Juracy Magalhães. (Monteiro1999, 14) 
7 Although large-scale immigration into Paraguay did not begin until the late 1960s and early 1970s, there are 
examples of Brazilians who succeeded in crossing the border to work in agriculture. Most of these Brazilians were 
peasant farmers, were the notable exception of Geremías Lunardelli, a Brazilian coffee baron who in the 1950s came 
to own more than one million hectares of subtropical forest lands in eastern Paraguay thanks to an initial 1952 land 
grant of 540,000 hectares given personally by Stroessner. (Kohlhepp 1999, 206; and Cortêz 1994, 17).  
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settling the border region. First, the lifting of restrictions on Brazilian immigration to Paraguay 
facilitated a steady flow of individual Brazilians who crossed over the border and established 
local settlements. Second, the creation of the Itaipu dam provided a political entry-point to 
interacting with the Paraguayan government while creating a massive, physical presence directly 
on the border itself.  
Facilitated by the lifting of the ban on Brazilian immigration, the construction of the 
Itaipu Dam sparked the first large wave of Brasiguayo settlement in Paraguay. The Itaipu 
reservoir flooded 111,332 hectares of land across eight municipalities in Brazil, representing 
13.9% of the entire region. Along with covering lands under cultivation, the reservoir also 
flooded 8,519 unique properties, 42 religious buildings and 95 schools. The majority (91%) of 
the flooded area was classified as ‘rural’ and the average size of each rural holding was 15 
hectares, hinting at the propensity toward small and medium-scale farming in the region. In all, 
42,444 people were displaced, representing 11.42% of the region’s total population.8 This 
process of expropriation and indemnification left thousands of rural Brazilians with no land and 
almost no money. As evidenced in the following quotation, many displaced Brazilians had little 
recourse but to resettle in Paraguay.  
I came to Paraguay because my property along the Paraná River was flooded; when 
Itaipu was constructed all of our lands were flooded. And since we were a large family, 
we were left with very little since the price that they paid us was not equivalent to the real 
value of the land, but rather to their own estimations… Since we had little money and the 
land [in Paraguay] was cheap and had lots of timber, we decided to leave for Paraguay. 
(Albuquerque 2010, 67)  
Having recently gained access to the fertile lands of eastern Paraguay, the Brazilian 
government actively encouraged its citizens to move across the border. Propaganda was 
broadcast in southern Brazil in newspapers and radio stations encouraging settlement in 
                                                 
8 This statistics were compiled from (Ribeiro 2002, 28) and (Germani 2003, 54-58) 
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Paraguay, proclaiming that lands were very cheap and could quickly improve their lives. Land 
was, in fact, much cheaper and could be bought anywhere from 1/6 to 1/10 of the price compared 
to Brazil.9 With funding from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
Paraguay’s government instituted credit and tax programs in the border region that proved very 
favorable to Brazilians. The credit rates made available in eastern Paraguay were far better than 
those in Brazil, with the added bonus of zero income tax and a minimal land tax that was rarely 
enforced. Whereas all farmers—regardless of nationality— enjoyed these credit and tax policies, 
Brazilians in particular benefitted from another critical initiative: there was no export tax. This 
essentially meant that all production on Paraguayan lands could flow freely back to Brazil. 
This first wave of Brazilian immigrants were not able to get citizenship across the border 
but they were motivated by the promise that their children, if born on Paraguayan land, would be 
Paraguayan citizens. Brazil, for its part, granted citizenship to children born in foreign nations if 
one of their parents ‘were in the service of the nation,’ leading Brazilian immigrants to think that 
their family would eventually have access to dual citizenship and political rights in both 
countries.10 Smallholders in Brazil became very receptive to their government’s publicity 
campaign to move across the border and, having been kicked off their lands, began to see 
Paraguay as a land of opportunity. As Kohlhepp (1999, 210) observes, for small landholders who 
had been expelled from Paraná, migration to eastern Paraguay did not only offer the prospect of 
higher quality lands; it included ‘the added allure of social mobility in a nascent border 
community.’ 
Take, for example, the case of one Brazilian peasant who in 1977 relocated to Paraguay. 
After selling his 17.5-hectare plot of land to the Itaipu Binational Corporation for 520,000 
                                                 
9 Kohlhepp (1999, 209) offers the 1/6 cost estimation, while Kleinpenning (1987, 178) quotes the price as 1/10 
compared to Brazil. 
10 (Albuquerque 2010, 209-210) 
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cruzeiros, he moved to Paraguay and bought 75 hectares for only 230,000. With the money 
remaining from the sale of his original lands, he was able to build a house, plant 25 hectares of 
soybeans and still had a bit left over to buy a tractor the following year. (Menezes 199, 137)  
Stories such as these most assuredly spread through rural Brazil and motivated thousands of 
farmers to seek new opportunities in Paraguay, causing the number of Brasiguaio settlers to 
increase dramatically. As late as 1969 there had been fewer than 11,000 Brazilians living in 
eastern Paraguay, yet less than a decade later that figure jumped to nearly 150,000. By 1983, 
over 360,000 Brazilians made their home in eastern Paraguay, marking the true emergence of 
Brasiguaio colonization. (Kohlhepp 1999, 208)  
 
Brasiguaios and the Military Regimes  
If the pattern of Brasiguayo settlement would seem to favor the development of the 
Brazilian state, why then was Paraguay so willing to allow—and even encourage—the settlement 
of its lands by foreigners? To answer this question, it is necessary to first discuss the evolution of 
Paraguayan politics over the previous decade.  
In 1963 the Paraguayan state created the Institute for Rural Wellbeing (IBR) and the 
Agrarian Statute, two entities that indicate the extent to which foreign settlement was being used 
as a primary development strategy.11 The IBR was charged with the distribution and 
development of state-owned lands, with the official aim of incorporating Paraguay’s peasant 
population into the nation’s economic development. In name, at least, the IBR was conceived as 
                                                 
11 Along with the IBR, another key mechanism of settlement were the private commercial enterprises known as 
colonizadoras that advertised on both sides of the border and oversaw the financial transactions with settler farmers. 
For much of the period of military rule, widespread corruption linked these two settlement mechanisms as 
government agencies and private corporations frequently colluded in dolling out land as political and personal 
favors. A final form of settlement came via spontaneous land occupations that involved groups of farmers taking 
over unused lands that belonged either to the government or to large landholders.  
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a tool of fair distribution that would modernize the countryside by gradually replacing the 
latifundio system with more equitable forms of property ownership and land use. Despite the 
declarations of a fair system of land management, the Paraguayan state distributed rural deeds in 
a manner that consolidated existing hierarchies. Elites throughout Paraguay were the main 
recipients of IBR titles, yet in the border regions specifically, a disproportionate number of 
government lands were handed over to Brazilians, since there existed a perception that ‘these 
foreign settlers brought intimate knowledge of the techniques of soy production and often had 
access to capital and credit.’12 Encouraging the development of Brazilian border settlements also 
benefited the Paraguayan state by having the effect of drastically driving up the price of land, 
with a rise in per-hectare value increasing up to twenty times between 1973 and 1994. (Kohlhepp 
1999, 211) 
More explicitly related to the emergence of Brazilian settlers, the Agrarian Statute 
established for the first time that the ‘Executive Power’ would hold the final authorization for the 
sale of lands. In practice, this modified the previous Agrarian Statute from 1940 that had 
prohibited the sale of lands along the border to foreign buyers.13 This new law therefore legalized 
and hastened the presence of Brazilians, and by 1967 Paraguay removed a law prohibiting the 
sale of lands within 150km of the border to foreigners.14 Furthermore, Kleinpenning (1987, 181) 
points out that, ‘although this ruling had often been circumnavigated before then, its abolition 
meant that land could now be sold openly and legally.’ In response to a question about 
Paraguay’s lifting of property restrictions for foreigners on land near the border, Alberto 
                                                 
12 (Menegotto 2004, 41). For example, one of the laws passed created by the IBR required that at least 20% of a 
local settlement population must be Paraguayan. Despite this new law, multiple examples were cited in the border 
regions of Alto Paraná and Canindeyú where Brazilians represented well over 80% of the inhabitants, despite being 
in clear violation of the law. (Kohlhepp 1999, 217) 
13 (Fogel 1990, 51) 
14 (Kohlhepp 199, 206) 
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Fernandez, a captain in the Paraguayan army and director of a private land settlement company, 
proclaimed: ‘We’re simply doing what Brazil already did when it stimulated the arrival of 
Italian, German, and Japanese settlers to its country.’15 
The distribution of land in Paraguay’s eastern border region followed a pattern of 
hierarchy and corruption that overtly privileged Brazilian settlers at the expense of Paraguayan 
peasants. Under the auspices of the IBR in the mid 1960s, the Paraguayan government sold off 
the state-owned lands to high-ranking officials and politicians, who frequently auctioned them 
off to Brazilian colonists.16 Corruption was especially rampant in the early years of the border’s 
colonization, as dishonest bureaucrats were given privileged government jobs in charge of land 
speculation and distribution. Feliú (2004, 47) cites a contemporary report proclaiming that ‘those 
in charge of controlling and taxing the area quickly became millionaires, or basically that instead 
of actually administering, all the officials charged taxes however they pleased without drawing 
up any legal documents.’ These processes mimic Baud and Schendel’s observation (1997, 217) 
that ‘When borderland elites were well integrated into networks of state power, they could 
become important allies of the state in its efforts to control borderland society.’ In this manner, 
the collusion of state and local elites created widespread bureaucratic corruption that exacerbated 
an already unequal form of land distribution throughout the border region.17  
 
                                                 
15 No author attributed. Por um sonho, a travessia de uma fronteira. Veja, March 3, 1971, 34. 
16 (Kleinpenning 1987, 179). It should be noted that the term “corruption” has been the subject of recent debate, 
wherein some scholars have considered it as a category imported “from the North” that is superficially imposed on 
foreign cultures. For more, see: Haller & Shore, 2005. Its use in this article is intended to portray instances where 
government bureaucrats and military officials acted outside of the purview of their immediate responsibilities, 
practices that enriched themselves and their acquaintances and/or distributed land in ways that ran counter to the 
letter of the law.  
17 For an analysis of why the Paraguayan government was willing to sell off its own land to Brazilians, see: 
(Kleinpenning 1987,180). It is important to observe, however, that although the Stroessner government clearly 
advocated for and facilitated the import of Brazilian immigrants, this process was not solely the product of official 
state policies. Much of this history resulted from the actions of local elites, members of the military, and corrupt 
functionaries who capitalized on opportunities in a poorly-regulated environment. 
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The Evolving Dynamics of Brasiguaios 
With a clear understanding of how—and why— the Paraguayan state encouraged 
Brazilian settlement, it is helpful now to concentrate more on the settlers themselves and attempt 
to understand the experiences and historical evolution of Brasiguaio communities. The initial 
wave of Brazilian immigrants to Paraguay was not defined by the powerful Brazilian magnates 
that would soon control the region, but rather by a steady stream of small-scale farmers pushed 
across the border by the Itaipu dam. For the most part, these early settlers belonged to two main 
groups. The first was comprised of poor immigrants from the Northeast of Brazil who worked as 
agricultural laborers, farmhands, or in the informal sector. The second was small- to medium-
scale agriculturalists from the southern states of Paraná, Río Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. 
For the most part, the agriculturalists in the latter group descended from German and Italian 
immigrants, transposing not only a class hierarchy in the new border settlements, but a racial one 
as well. Since these Euro-descendent Brazilians often brought with them capital and industrial 
tools, they immediately gained favor with the Stroessner regime and were able to rise quickly 
through the social ranks. (Fogel and Riquelme 2005, 124) The upward mobility of these southern 
Brazilians is a stark contrast to the marginalized—and racialized—condition of both the poor 
Afro-Brazilians from the North East and the mostly indigenous and Guarani-speaking local 
Paraguayan peasants.  
A passage from a 1971 article in the Brazilian magazine Veja speaks to the fragile 
position in which these initial immigrants arrived in Paraguay. Interestingly enough, the 
description also ends with a tinge of optimism, suggesting both that the immigrants themselves 
were hopeful of finding a better life, and that Brazilian society looked positively on the 
relocation of its own citizens to a neighboring country. 
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Frequently over the past three years, dozens of families from Minas, São Paulo, Paraná, 
Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, undertake a new and impressive westward march 
on trucks that resemble ancient caravans. Loaded with disjointed beds, precarious 
luggage, modest clothing and, sometimes, with melancholy cows, malnourished pigs, 
speckled dogs, and agitated roosters… However, their most important cargo is hope.18 
 Upon arriving in Paraguay, however, these early Brasiguaios did not find entirely 
welcoming circumstances. Although the military regimes of both Brazil and Paraguay actively 
encouraged Brazilian immigration, the bureaucratic structures were not yet in place to provide 
the new settler farmers with access to the necessary paperwork or resources. Many Brasiguaios 
were forced to pay exorbitant amounts of money to receive their migration papers and in the 
words of one observer, they ‘lived between illegality and permanent extortion from the 
Paraguayan authorities.’19 Large numbers of Brazilian immigrants also struggled to gain legal 
ownership of the lands that they bought either directly from the Paraguayan state, or through 
companies based in Brazil known as colonizadoras. In a 1981 Folha de São Paulo article, a 
Brazilian activist named Juvêncio Mazzarollo claimed that by the end of the 1970s over 80% of 
Brasiguaios did not have the deed to their land. While Mazzarollo’s estimations might be a bit 
elevated—he was a member of rural opposition movements and actively sought the end of both 
dictatorships—they indicate the reality that early Brazilian immigrants were often exploited and 
extorted by Paraguayan officials. Additionally, Mazzarollo cites an example from the 
municipality of Puerto Sece in Paraguay where 400 Brasiguaio families were forced to pay four 
times for the same land to four different administrators. (Ribeiro 1981, 8) 
Considering the challenges faced by the initial wave of immigrants, and knowing their 
role in laying down the first roots of what would become a thriving immigrant enclave, the early 
                                                 
18 No author attributed. Por um sonho, a travessia de uma fronteira. Veja, March 3, 1971, 34. 
19 (Fogel and Riquelme 2005, 126). It is necessary to note that Paraguayan smallholders confronted similar 
problems, underscoring the fact that land bureaucracies exploited farmers regardless of their nationality. Moreover, 
the illegality and pervasiveness of these processes suggest the extent to which local practices in the border region 
developed independently of official state policy. For more on Paraguayan smallholders and the problems of land 
titles, see: Souchaud and Carámbula 2007. 
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Brasiguaios must be interpreted as a form of agricultural shock troops. Simply put, they were 
mobilized and exploited so that lands would be cleared, farms would be settled, and a base would 
be established from which larger development and industry could take root.  
One of the more tangible measures of the borderlands’ reconfiguration is through an 
examination of the deforestation that was necessary to clear fields for cultivation of Brasiguaio-
controlled lands. Since the development of these new agricultural sectors necessitated open lands 
for cultivation, the first major Brazilian-led commercial activity along the Paraguayan border 
was in the logging and cutting down of trees for export. Menezes (1990, 211) notes that although 
not comparable in scope to the deforestation that had already begun in the Amazonian rainforest, 
‘the Brazilians, in a short amount of time, unleashed some of the worst devastation in the history 
of Latin America along Paraguay’s eastern region.’ In fact, between 1945 and 1991, 
deforestation in the border regions of Amambay, Canindeyú, Alto Paraná, Caaguazá, and Itapúa 
resulted in a 58.8% loss in forests. (Kohlhepp 1999, 212) 
As the first wave of Brazilians began farming along the Paraguayan border, advances in 
agricultural technologies accelerated the settlement of the entire region. Starting in the 1970s, 
new technologies led to the increased mechanization of agriculture, allowing small and medium-
scale farmers to expand their lands under cultivation without needing to hire more workers. This 
facilitated a new wave of land grabbing by Brazilian farmers who gradually expanded beyond 
the border regions. The new concentration of Brazilians in Paraguayan territories pushed out 
local peasants who, lacking the ability to acquire new lands, were often forced to relocate to 
urban centers. Confronted by the encroachment of Brazilian immigrants—along with the 
repressive structures of Stroessner’s regime—rural Paraguayans took action in defense of their 
livelihoods and in 1970 formed a collective known as the Agrarian Leagues. For government 
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authorities, this organization was seen as a fundamental threat to national security, and 
Stroessner responded by deploying the army to expel peasants and farmers. One example comes 
from the municipality of Yhú in the Caaguazú, where in 1970 Paraguayan soldiers forcefully 
removed and set fire to the houses of 1,300 families in order to confiscate their lands.20 Once 
local Paraguayans had been kicked out, military personnel frequently seized the lands and sold 
them off as private holdings—often to Brazilian colonists.  
These patterns formed a vicious cycle in the development and reorientation of eastern 
Paraguay. As more small-scale Brasiguaios settled in Paraguay, their presence pushed out local 
farmers whose subsequent mobilizations were used by the government as a pretext to further 
appropriate peasant lands. That these territories were increasingly auctioned off to wealthy 
Brazilian serves as a striking arc in this narrative of an unequal borderland. 
This was also the period when small-scale and diversified subsistence farming was 
replaced by soybean production. Between 1972-1977, the area under cultivation in Paraguay rose 
at an annual rate of 16%, of which 25% was dedicated exclusively to soybean agriculture. 
(Menezes 1990, 14) Soy first appeared in Paraguayan agricultural censuses in the 1970s, and its 
production expanded such that within 30 years Paraguay became the world’s sixth largest 
producer of soybeans—a significant indicator for a country with fewer than seven million 
inhabitants. The cultivation of soybeans became so central to the Paraguayan economy that by 
2004, the crop occupied nearly two million hectares—over fifty percent of all cultivated lands in 
the country. (Albuquerque 2010, 83) 
                                                 
20 (Riquelme 2005, 136). It should also be noted that opposition to Brazilian settlers also came from established 
political structures in Paraguay. In 1972 and 1974, leaders from the oppositional parties of Partido Liberal Radical 
Autentico (PLRA) and the Partido Febrista attempted to institute a law prohibiting the sale of land to foreigners 
along the border. These were some of the first institutional reactions against the 1963 Agrarian Statute that had 
originally legalized the sale of land to foreigners and specifically favored Brazilians. (Albuquerque 2010, 118) 
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Unlike previous crops grown in the borderlands, soybean agriculture required relatively 
low amounts of labor, meaning that the impact of soy cultivation on poverty was mediated 
through a decrease in employment and the concentration of lands and revenues primarily in the 
hands of Brazilians.21 This represented a dramatic shift in the border region’s agricultural 
production, since prior to the expansion of the soybean industry the leading crop had been 
cotton. Unlike soybeans, cotton had been almost entirely produced by peasant laborers on small 
plots of land and with relatively limited technology. Another critical marker of the region’s 
economic shift was the change in the market forces that determined the value and destination of 
each crop. Whereas the Paraguayan government regulated cotton prices, soybean prices 
fluctuated according to the international market.22 This reflected the Stroessner regime’s desire 
to discard Paraguay’s traditional reliance on small-scale agriculture, preferring instead to 
prioritize the inflow of foreign capital and the orientation of production toward global markets. It 
is impossible to speak of the rise of Paraguay’s soybean industry without recognizing the 
dramatically increased presence of Brazilian immigrants along the border. According to 
Souchaud (2005,19) the three biggest soy-producing regions in Paraguay became Alto Paraná, 
Itapúa, and Canindeyú, which comprised 84% of national soy production. It is no coincidence 
that these three regions are also the exact areas with the highest concentration of Brazilian 
immigrants.  
The case of Brazilians in Paraguay is especially interesting when viewed in the context of 
the countries’ immediate geographic proximity to each other. Most of the necessary equipment 
was purchased in Brazil, and most vehicles not only had Brazilian license plates, but were also 
registered in Brazil, meaning that their taxes were likewise paid in Brazil. (Kohlhepp 1999, 210) 
                                                 
21 (Fogel 1990, 47) 
22 For more on the differences between cotton and soybean production, see: (Nagel 1991, 112-114). 
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Additionally, the reconfiguration of Paraguay’s border region was strengthened by the cultural 
practices of Brazilian immigrants. As is typical with most settler communities, social structures 
were brought to the new region that facilitated a consolidation of Brazilian culture. This included 
the high proportion of Portuguese-language newspapers and television stations, the establishment 
of various Brazilian churches and cultural centers, and the naming of cities in Paraguay that 
reflected the rising Brazilian influence: Novo Toledo, Novo Paraná, and most strikingly, Novo 
Brasil. (Albuquerque 2010, 94)  
 
The Perils and Promise of Return Migration 
 Beginning in the early 1980s, what had been a unidirectional flow of immigrants from 
Brazil to Paraguay saw the first significant examples of return migration. This emergent trend 
was the result of decreasing stability in the military regimes of both nations, and a corresponding 
rise in land conflicts on each side of the border. The number of Brasiguaios who returned to their 
native lands was never significant enough to alter their steadily growing demographics in eastern 
Paraguay, but the pattern of reverse migration is nonetheless evocative of the fluctuations and 
fragmented development that have defined this immigrant enclave. 
 In 1981, the largest daily newspaper in Brazil, a Folha de São Paulo, ran a weeklong 
series called ‘The Invasion of Paraguay’ that focused on the multiple aspects of daily life in 
Paraguay for Brazilian immigrants. Under the subhead title ‘The fear of returning, a major 
worry,’ an interview with a Brazilian immigrant named Afonso Ridgher indicated an awareness 
that Brasiguaios were allowed to live in Paraguay only because General Stroessner allowed them 
to. Ridgher spoke of his concerns that any possible regime change in Paraguay would require 
him to uproot his family and return to Brazil, claiming that, ‘Many say that we will have to cross 
the river again, if there comes another president.’ (Ribeiro 1981, 6) Although Stroessner’s 
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regime did not fall until the end of the decade, the 1980s saw the slow reassertion of political 
freedoms. As Stroessner’s grip on power gradually loosened, rural Paraguayan peasants began 
occupying properties and increasingly targeted Brasiguaios who were considered usurpers of 
lands that rightfully belonged to the peasantry.23  
The fact that most Brasiguaios were small-scale farmers who suffered similar repression 
as Paraguayan peasants became almost irrelevant. Albuquerque (2010, 107) argues that along 
with being vilified for the privilege and wealth of a select few Brasiguaios, most Brazilian 
immigrants were seen as ‘“gringos” responsible for the pollution of rivers, deforestation, 
destruction of the soil and the drunkenness of teenagers and adults. They are [viewed], 
consequently, as colonizers, invaders and destructors of nature and of Paraguayan culture.’ 
Compounded by the hardships faced by the average Brasiguaio, the demonization and 
ostracization from local communities persuaded many to yearn for a return to Brazil. José 
Raimundo, a 68-year-old Brazilian immigrant living in eastern Paraguay summarized his 
disenchantment with life as a Brasiguaio: ‘Everything was an illusion. Now I only want to sell 
my five alquieres and return to die in Colatina, [Brazil].’24 
The opening spaces of political dissent mapped onto the animosity toward Brasiguaios as 
growing waves of land conflicts between Paraguayan peasants and Brazilian immigrants 
accelerated the scale of return migration, primarily back to the states of Mato Grosso and 
Rondônia.25 While land-owning Brasiguaios might have been motivated to return to Brazil 
because of the increasing conflicts with Paraguayan peasants, many poor Brasiguaios were 
motivated by the promise of agrarian change being put forth by a new movement of landless 
workers in Brazil. In January of 1984, the Landless Workers Movement (MST) was founded in 
                                                 
23 (Albuquerque 2010, 231) 
24 (Ribeiro 1981, 8) 
25 (Kohlhepp 1999, 218)  
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the Brazilian city of Cascavel and launched a campaign of land occupations, demanding a 
sweeping program of national agrarian reform. According to Cácia Cortêz (1994, 45), it is was 
the emergence of the MST and the rise in its successful land occupations in the mid-to-late 1980s 
that signaled to marginalized Brasiguaios that it was time to return to Brazil. Whereas Paraguay 
did not return to democratic rule until the end of the decade, Brazil’s military regime handed 
over power in 1985, adding further incentives for poor Brazilian immigrants in Paraguay to 
migrate back to their native lands. 
The process of return migration, however, was far from simple. As mentioned in the 
discussion of the genesis of the term ‘Brasiguaio,’ these Brazilian immigrants often felt as 
though they no longer belonged to their home country and were greeted with acute animosity 
upon their return. Brasiguaios became stigmatized and were seen as dangerous outsiders by 
political authorities and the landed elite, who feared that the Brasiguaios would return in large 
numbers to threaten the established social order. (Albuquerque 2010, 229) The less-than-
enthusiastic reception of returning Brasiguaios should be understand not as a markedly new 
phenomenon, but rather as a continuation of the inequalities that they already confronted for 
decades. 
 
Toward a Redefined Border 
 When General Alfredo Stroessner fell from power in 1989, a huge wave of land 
occupations and peasant organizing spread throughout Paraguay. Taking advantage of the newly 
opened political landscape, these peasants asserted their own demands on a society that had long 
suppressed them. Indicating a profound legacy of the military regime’s development of Brazilian 
immigrant enclaves, the majority of this renewed peasant political resistance occurred in the 
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same regions that had been settled, farmed, and monopolized by Brasiguaios. Of the 91 land 
occupations recorded in the first year after the fall of Stroessner, 46 (51%) took place in the 
frontier department of Alto Paraná. Additionally, the border departments of Caaguazé and Itapúa 
recorded 14 and 10 land occupations, respectively. (Nagel 1999, 159) This explosion of rural 
unrest—some of the most concentrated protest actions in the immediate aftermath of Stroessner’s 
fall—reveals the extent to which Paraguay’s eastern border region had suffered at the hands of 
the dictatorship.  
But the anguish that reverberated throughout the Alto Paraná borderlands was not 
exclusively reserved for Paraguayan peasants. Instead, it was shared in almost equal part by the 
masses of poor Brazilians living on Paraguayan lands. These impoverished Brasiguaios had 
migrated to Paraguay either by choice (encouraged by Brazil’s publicity blitz) or by force (the 
construction of the Itaipu Dam and the inflation of land prices in Brazil), yet faced unending 
exploitation—often by their own countrymen. Understanding the unique qualities of Brasiguaio 
communities thus allows us to explore the equally unique borderlands between Brazil and 
Paraguay and the ways in which it has become a space were inequalities are reproduced and 
performed. The phrase ‘Brasiguaio’ is therefore ripe with multiple meanings and connotations. 
Although Brasiguaios were originally given their name in the context of being a people without a 
country—perceived essentially as a people adrift—over the course of nearly half a century they 
came to represent the physical and ideological dynamics of an entire region. Signifying both the 
wealth and the poverty generated by the settlement of eastern Paraguay, Brasiguaios were 
vehicles for the reorientation of borders and the blurring of national, ethnic, and class 
boundaries. As such, Brasiguaio communities have themselves become sites of inequality, 
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embodying the complexities of immigrant enclaves and the processes that shape and redefine 
borderlands.
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